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NOTES
NLRA PREEMPTION OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION LAW PROVIDING BENEFITS
FOR STRIKERS-NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO.
V. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
The temporary payment of unemployment compensation benefits is pro-
vided for by law in each state. 1 These laws are similar in many respects
because federal law requires that the statutes of each state be drawn to meet
certain requirements, 2 and state legislatures often have merely adopted the
unemployment compensation "draft bills" 3 prepared by the Social Security
Board. a Federal law, however, does not impose any requirement regarding
the payment of unemployment compensation to strikers. Consequently, a
few states allow strikers in some circumstances to receive unemployment
compensation benefits, 5 although the large majority of states specifically
provide that persons whose unemployment is caused by participation in a
strike are not eligible at any time for such benefits. 6
1. D. NELSON, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 190 (1969); Haggart, Unemployment Compen-
sation During Labor Disputes, 37 NEB. L. REV. 668, 670 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Haggart].
2. These requirements are set forth at 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 503 (1976).
3. SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, DRAFT BILLS FOR STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
OF THE POOLED FUND AND EMPLOYER RESERVE ACCOUNT TYPES (rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter
cited as DRAFT BILLS].
4. Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U. CHI.
L. REV. 294, 294 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Shaduri.
5. For example, some states disqualify strikers only if the labor dispute results in a "stop-
page of work" at the employer's establishment. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3315(4)
(1974); HAW. REV. STAT. § 383-30(4) (1976); N.M. REV. STAT. § 51-1-7(D) (1978). Other states
permit strikers to receive benefits if they have been laid off from a subsequent job. See, e.g.,
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 1193(4)(C) (Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.29(8) (1978).
New Hampshire disqualifies strikers unless the strike which caused the unemployment resulted
from the employer's violation of a collective bargaining agreement. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
282:4(F)(3) (1977). Maine allows strikers to receive benefits if they are protesting hazardous
conditions at their place of employment. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 1193(4)(D) (Supp. 1978).
New York, N.Y. LABOR LAW § 592.1 (McKinney 1977), and Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-44-16 (1968), disqualify strikers from receiving benefits for eight and seven weeks respec-
tively, after which time the disqualification is removed. Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 87-106(d)(2) (Supp. 1977), and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(d)(1) (1953), disqualify strikers
unless the strike results from the employer's violation of a state or federal labor relations or
wage-hour law.
6. A typical provision is that of Illinois:
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits for any week with respect to which it
is found that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which
exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at
which he is or was last employed. . . . This Section shall not apply if it is shown
that (A) the individual is not participating in or financing or directly interested in
the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work and (B) he does not belong to
a grade or class of workers of which immediately before the commencement of the
stoppage of work there were members employed at the premises at which the stop-
page occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in
the dispute; provided, that a lockout by the employer or the individual's failure to
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Recently there have been challenges7 to some of the state statutes which
authorize the payment of unemployment compensation to strikers, on the
ground that such payments disrupt the federal policy of free collective bar-
gaining expressed in the National Labor Relations Act 8 (NLRA) and the
Labor Management Relations Act 9 (LMRA) and are thus void under the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. a° Federal courts
hearing these challenges have disagreed as to whether the statutes are
preempted by federal law.1 The United States Supreme Court granted
cross a picket line at such factory, establishment, or other premises shall not, in
itself, be deemed a participation by him in the labor dispute.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 434 (1977).
7. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (chal-
lenging New York's statute); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (lst Cir.) (challenging
Rhode Island's statute), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973); Dow Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 428 F.
Supp. 86 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (challenging Michigan's statute); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Dep't
of Labor & Indus. Relations, 405 F. Supp. 275 (D. Hawaii 1976) (challenging Hawaii's statute),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978); Kimbell v. Employment Security Comm'n of N.M., No.
10323 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Dec. 29, 1975) (challenging New Mexico's statute), appeal dismissed, 429
U.S. 806 (1976), See also cases cited in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 15, New York Tel. Co.
v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
8. National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
NLRA].
9. Labor Management Relations Act §§ 1-503, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as LMRA].
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof, and all the Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or the Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The supremacy clause applies because Congress has the authority to regulate labor relations.
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (the regulation of labor relations
falls tinder the commerce clause of the constitution).
11. Two federal district courts have held that statutes which authorize the payment of un-
employment compensation to strikers are preempted. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State
Dep't of Labor, 434 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440
U.S. 519 (1979); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations, 405 F.
Supp. 275 (D. Hawaii 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978). Evidencing an agreement with
these district courts that such state laws are preempted, the first circuit in Grinnell Corp.
v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973), reversed the District
Court of Rhode Island's dismissal of a preemption challenge to that state's unemployment com-
pensation statute for failure to state a claim. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 344 F. Supp. 749
(D.R.I. 1972). The first circuit determined that Congress had not unmistakably manifested its
intent regarding preemption of state laws which pay benefits to strikers, and that it therefore
could not rule categorically that no evidence could be produced which would establish that
Rhode Island's law substantially disturbs the collective bargaining process. Grinnell Corp. v.
Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 453 (1st Cir. 1973).
Similarly, the district court in Dow Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 428 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Mich.
1977), held that summary judgment should not be granted to defendants in a preemption chal-
lenge to Michigan's unemployment compensation law because there was a factual issue as to
whether the degree of impact of the payment of benefits to strikers was so great that the
operation of Michigan's statute frustrated federal labor policy. Id. at 91.
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certiorari' 2 in one of these cases, New York Telephone Co. v. New York
State Department of Labor, 13 no doubt because of the differences between
the federal courts, 14 the fact that fourteen similar cases were pending before
federal courts at the time petitioners applied for certiorari, 15 and the impor-
tance of the preemption question to unions and employers.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court holding
that New York's unemployment compensation law is not preempted by the
statutory policy expressed by Congress in the NLRA and LMRA. 16 This
decision follows the recent trend of federal courts to give greater deference
to state regulations which to some extent affect the operation of federal
law. 17 It failed to clarify, however, the approach to be taken in a case in
which it is alleged that a state law should be preempted because it frustrates
the operation of federal labor law.
This Note will examine and criticize the Court's resolution of the preemp-
tion problem raised in New York Telephone Co. It will focus on the pre-
sumption of preemptive congressional intent invoked by the Court and the
lack of suitable precedent for both the use of the presumption and the
rationale which led to its use. The Note will then comment on the decision's
probable impact on labor relations as well as its precedential effect on the
doctrine of federal preemption.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO.
The Communications Workers of America (CWA) represent about seventy
percent of the non-management employees of the nationwide Bell Telephone
Companies. 18 In 1971, most of these employees went on strike against the
Bell Telephone Companies over a contract dispute. 19 After four days an
agreement was reached between the Bell System Companies and the
CWA. 20 As a result of this agreement, all Bell employees, excepting the
Contrary to these holdings, the second circuit concluded in New York Tel. Co. v. New York
State Dep't of Labor, 566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 519 (1979), that federal law
does not preempt state statutes which provide for the payment of unemployment benefits to
strikers.
12. 435 U.S. 941 (1978).
13. 566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
14. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 10.
15. Id. at 15.
16. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
17. See note 148 infra.
18. 440 U.S. at 522.
19. Id. On April 30, 1971, CWA contracts with the two Bell System "pattern setting" com-
panies expired. See note 22 infra. No agreement in regard to the terms of a new contract
having been reached, the contracts with these two companies were extended on a day-by-day
basis until July 14, 1971, as were CWA contracts with other Bell System Companies which
expired between April 30 and July 14. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor,
434 F. Supp. 810, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). On July 14, the CWA called a nationwide strike to
compel the Bell System to reach a new agreement. Id. at 812-13.
-20. 434 F. Supp. at 813.
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petitioners' employees, 2 1 returned to work. This group continued to
strike, intending to disassociate the New York units of the CWA from the
nationwide contract, which was based on agreements reached by representa-
tive "pattern setting" companies. 22 The strike in New York was not settled
for seven months, at which time the employees were given a contract that
increased their wages above the level prescribed by the nationwide con-
tract. 23 After the petitioners' employees had been on strike for eight
weeks, they became eligible for unemployment compensation benefits under
New York law. 24 By the end of the strike, New York Telephone Company's
striking employees had received $49 million in unemployment compensa-
tion. 25 As a result of the strike, and under the complicated scheme by
which unemployment compensation benefits are funded in New York, 26
21. 440 U.S. at 522. The petitioners included New York Telephone Co., Western Electric
Co., American Telephone & Telegraph Co. Long Lines Department, and Empire City Subway
Co. Id. at 522 n.1.
22. Id. Under the pattern bargaining format, the Bell System management and CWA offi-
cials would select two Bell affiliate companies and attempt to reach a contract settlement with
each. These contracts would then be used as the basis for the contracts of all Bell System
Companies. The New York CWA units, comprising about 38,000 members, id. at 522, at-
tempted to break the pattern and obtain a more advantageous contract by refusing to ratify the
pattern contract agreed upon by CWA officials and Bell affiliates. Id. at 522 n.1.
23. Id. at 522 & n.1.
24. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 592.1 (McKinney 1977). The strikers received an average of $75 per
week tax free. 440 U.S. at 523. Some strikers received as much as $95 per week. 434 F. Supp.
at 812.
25. 440 U.S. at 523. Because New York Telephone Co. employed by far the largest
number of workers who were on strike against petitioners, see 434 F. Supp. at 813, figures
reflecting its experience in funding the unemployment compensation payments are cited in the
text accompanying notes 25-28 and in note 28 infra.
26. Under New York law, the state maintains an "unemployment insurance find" which
consists of all monies available to be paid as unemployment benefits. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 550
(McKinney 1977). The unemployment insurance fund is divided into two main accounts. The
"general account" is made up of monies obtained from federal contributions, see 42 U.S.C.
9 1103 (1976), occasionally employer contributions, and the earnings on the money in the fund.
N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 577.1(a), 577.2 (McKinney 1977). The money in the general account may
be used in conjunction with separate federal contributions to administer the unemployment
compensation program, to finance refunds, to pay benefits to certain employees who move into
New York from out of state, and to pay claims against "employer accounts" which show negative
balances. Id. §§ 577.1(b), 581.1(e). The "employer accounts" contain all of the contributions
from individual employers. The amount and rate of contribution from any one employer is
based on the employer's experience rating, i.e., the amount of unemployment benefits already
paid to employees previously employed. Id. §§ 570.1, 581.
Employees are generally eligible for 156 "effective days" of benefits. Id. §§ 523, 590.4, 601.
Not all of the unemployment compensation received by employees, however, is charged to the
employer's account, thereby affecting the employer's experience rating. First, the employer's
account is only charged with four days of benefits for every five during which the claimant was
employed by that employer. After this computation uses up all the time claimant worked for the
employer, the benefits are charged to the claimant's next previous employer, or to the general
account, once former employers are used up. Id. § 581.1(e). Second, employers have limited
liability for payment to employees who were employed at more than one job while working for
the employer. Id. Third, any benefits paid by the federal government are not charged to
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New York Telephone Company's unemployment compensation fund was de-
pleted by about $40 million. 27 Within a span of four years New York Tele-
phone Company was required to pay $27.3 million in unemployment com-
pensation taxes to replace partially the amount of the fund expended as a
result of the strike. 28
Petitioners brought suit in federal district court against the New York
State Department of Labor and the state officials responsible for the ad-
ministration of the unemployment compensation fund. 29 Petitioners sought
reimbursement of the increased unemployment compensation taxes paid as a
consequence of the strike, an injunction against the enforcement of section
592.1 of the New York Labor Law, 30 and a declaration that the statute was
preempted because it frustrated the operation of federal law. 31
The district court, having examined the effect of unemployment compen-
sation on strikes, determined that the availability of benefits to strikers is a
substantial factor affecting an employee's willingness to strike initially or to
employer accounts. Id. Fourth, only one-half of the last 52 effective days are charged to the
employer's account. The other half is paid from the general account, and the general account is
credited with amounts received from the federal government under 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-502,
1101-1105. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 601.4 (McKinney 1977). As can be seen, the struck employer
does not pay all of the unemployment compensation benefits received by the strikers. Rather,
the federal government and New York employers as a whole pay significant amounts.
27. 434 F. Supp. at 813.
28. Petitioner New York Telephone Co. funded about 56% of the unemployment compensa-
tion payments made to its striking employees. This percentage was obtained by the following
calculation. In 1971, the year of the strike, New York Telephone Co. paid $3 million in un-
employment compensation taxes. As a result of the strike and the depletion of the company's
account, New York Telephone Co. paid $11.6 million in taxes in 1972, $12.7 million in 1973, $6
million in 1974, and $9 million in 1975. Assuming that if there had been no strike New York
Telephone Co. would have paid about $3 million in each of these years, New York Telephone
Co. paid $27.3 million in additional taxes as a result of the strike. This figure represents 56% of
the $49 million in total benefits paid to New York Telephone Co. employees during the strike.
See 434 F. Supp. at 813 n.4 (1974-75 figures); A. THIEBLOT & R. CORWIN, WELFARE AND
STRIKES 176 (1972) [hereinafter as THIEBLOT & CORWIN] (1972-73 figures), citing N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 1972, at 34, col. 2.
29. 434 F. Supp. at 810.
30. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 592.1 (McKinney 1977) reads as follows:
The accumulation of benefit rights by a claimant shall be suspended during a
period of seven consecutive weeks beginning with the day after he lost his employ-
ment because of a strike, a lockout, or other industrial controversy in the establish-
ment in which he was employed, except that benefit rights may be accumulated
before the expiration of such seven weeks beginning the day after such strike, lock-
out or other industrial controversy was terminated.
The seven week waiting period is in addition to an approximately one week waiting period
required for all unemployment compensation claimants. See N.Y. LABOR LAW § 590.9 (McKin-
ney 1977).
31. 440 U.S. at 525. The theory upon which the New York law was challenged was that
federal labor law has balanced the economic bargaining powers of labor and management
through protections and prohibitions of certain conduct by labor and management, and that the
New York statute, by increasing the bargaining power of labor and by decreasing the bargaining
power of management, had altered the balance struck by federal law. 434 F. Supp. at 812.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
continue an ongoing strike. 32 After concluding that New York did not have
a substantial interest in the payment of unemployment compensation to
strikers, the court stated that the only issue was whether the New York
statute conflicted with the policy of federal labor law. 33 The court reasoned
that because the policy of federal labor law is to foster free collective bar-
gaining between unions and management, U subject only to the balance of
bargaining power struck by Congress in the NLRA and LMRA, the payment
of unemployment benefits to strikers conflicts with federal law by upsetting
the balance of power. 35  Because the law conflicted with federal law, the court
held that the New York statute was preempted.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 36  The appellate
court did not question the district court's finding that the New York statute
altered the balance of power in the collective bargaining relationship and
therefore conflicted with federal labor policy. 37 After examining the legisla-
tive history of the NLRA, Title IX of the Social Security Act, 3 and other
materials, however, the court held that Congress had not expressed an in-
tent to preempt state laws which provide unemployment compensation ben-
efits for strikers. 39 The court therefore concluded that states are free to pay
unemployment compensation to strikers, consequently upholding New
York's law. 40 The United States Supreme Court affirmed. 41
THE DOCTRINE OF LABOR LAW PREEMPTION
The doctrine of labor law preemption has been developed by a line of
United States Supreme Court cases decided largely since 1945. 42 The doc-
trine concerns the extent to which Congress has allowed the states 43 and the
federal judiciary 44 to regulate activity touching upon labor-management rela-
32. 434 F. Supp. at 814.
33. Id. at 819.
34. 1d. at 820.
35. Id. at 824.
36. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977).
37. Id. at 390.
38. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 901-910, 49 Stat. 639, 639-45 (1935) (current
version at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504, 1101-1108 (1976)).
39. 566 F.2d at 395. This holding was made despite the court's recognition that generally
state statutes which touch upon labor relations should be neutral. Id.
40. Id.
41. 440 U.S. at 546.
42. See cases cited in notes 43-45, 54, 58, 64, 66 & 67 infra. See generally R. GORMAN,
BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW 766-86 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GORMAN]: Bryson, A Matter of
Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1037 (1973);
Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Cox];
Lesnick Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Gannon, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
469 (1972); Comment, Federal Preemption in Labor Relations, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 128 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Federal Preemption].
43. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
187 (1978).
44. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971).
[Vol. 29:115
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tions. The purpose of federal preemption of state regulation is to avoid, to
the largest extent practicable, the conflict inherent in regulation of labor
relations by multiple tribunals. 45
Federal regulation of the labor-management bargaining relationship is set
forth in the NLRA and LMRA. The NLRA was designed to establish a bal-
ance of bargaining power between employers and employees46 by giving
employees enumerated rights to engage in certain collective bargaining ac-
tivities 47 and by placing certain restrictions upon employers' and employees'
freedom to engage in other collective bargaining activities. 4 The Supreme
Court has held that a state may not exercise jurisdiction over claims brought
under the NLRA. 9 Indeed, any claim of violation of the protections or
prohibitions of the NLRA may be brought only before the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), the tribunal established by Congress to adjudicate such
claims. 50 Consequently, states are not empowered to regulate collective
bargaining.
45. Id.; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
187 (1978); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953). See also GORMAN,
supra note 42, at 767-68, 775-76.
46. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971). See
generally NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); GORMAN, supra note 42, at 296; Cox, supra note
42, at 1339.
47. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 7 gives employees the rights, inter alia, to
join unions, to bargain collectively, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining, and to refrain from such activities except to the extent prohibited by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a union as a condition of employment. Id.
48. Id. at § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). Some of the prohibitions upon employers are: inter-
ference with employees' exercise of section 7 rights, discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
with the intent to encourage or discourage union membership, and refusal to bargain collec-
tively with a union. Prohibitions upon labor organizations include, inter alia: interfering with
employees' exercise of section 7 rights, refusing to bargain collectively with an employer, re-
quiring employees to pay an excessive fee as a condition of becoming a union member, and
engaging in certain types of strikes and coercive activities. Id.
49. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538
(1945). The state would be barred from entertaining such claims by the operation of the suprem-
acy clause. See note 10 supra. In general, the Supreme Court has found state regulatory
power to be preempted in the following situations: (1) when Congress has exhibited an intent to
completely occupy the field, see, e.g., Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926);
(2) when there is a direct conflict between state law and the express prohibitions of the federal
law, see, e.g., Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); and (3) when there is a conflict between the
state regulation and the accomplishment of the full purposes of Congress. See, e.g., Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). See also Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243
(1859) and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824), for early judicial statements of
the preemption doctrine. See generally TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 6-22 to
6-27 (1978); Comment, Federal Preemption: Governmental Interests and the Role of the Su-
preme Court, 1966 DUKE L.J. 484 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Governmental Interests].
In the field of labor law preemption the Supreme Court has found that concurrent state and
NLRB adjudication of claims of violation of the NLRA involved too large a potential for conflict
of regulation and, consequently, too large a possibility of frustration of the purposes of federal
law. See note 53 and text accompanying notes 53-55 infra.
50. NLRA §§ 3-6, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156 (1976).
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In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 51 the Supreme Court
went a step further and held that a state is without such jurisdiction even if
the right allegedly violated or the activity allegedly engaged in is only argu-
ably within the purview of the NLRA. 52 The Garmon Court reasoned that
because Congress entrusted the application of federal labor law to a special
tribunal, Congress evidently intended that centralized administration was
necessary both to obtain uniform enforcement of its legislation and to avoid
the conflict 53 likely to result from local adjudication of labor controver-
sies. 54 The Court concluded that the same potential for conflict of regula-
tion exists when the threshold question for decision is whether or not the
particular activity is governed by the NLRA, as when the activity is clearly
regulated by the NLRA. 55
It is not, however, only conduct arguably within the jurisdiction of the
NLRB that a state is without power to regulate. By way of dictum in Garner
v. Teamsters Local 776 56 and subsequently Garmon, 57 the Court suggested
that eveii if an activity is neither arguably prohibited nor protected by the
NLRA, state regulation of that activity may be preempted if the regulation
would conflict with or frustrate federal labor law. Five years later, the Gar-
mon and Garner dicta were sustained in Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton.58
In Morton, an Ohio court awarded damages to a struck employer under state
law because, during a strike, the union had persuaded management person-
nel of a customer of the struck employer to cease doing business with that
employer. This conduct, which was illegal under Ohio law, was neither pro-
tected nor prohibited by the NLRA. 59 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
held that the use of this "weapon of self help" 60 could not be barred by the
state, for prohibition of such conduct would operate to alter the economic
51. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
52. Id. at 245.
53. Id. at 242-43. Some of the diversities and conflicts thought likely to result from concur-
rent jurisdiction by the NLRB and the states over collective bargaining activities are: (1) dupli-
cation of effort if state and federal proceedings were to go on simultaneously; (2) risk of conflict
in scheduling of proceedings and availability of evidence; (3) different findings of fact in close
cases caused by chance, court "philosophy," or rules of procedure; and (4) difference in the
timing and form of state and NLRB remedies. Cox, supra note 42, at 1342.
54. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Carmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959).
55. Id. at 244-45.
56. 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953).
57. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
58. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
59. Id. at 258. Similar conduct, however, has been prohibited. Under the NLRA it is illegal
to encourage non-management employees of a customer of the struck employer to exert pres-
sure on their employer with the object of forcing him to cease doing business with the struck
employer. NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
60. "Weapons of self help" are those tactics which the NLRA allows employees and
employers to use to Support their collective bargaining positions. See Local 20, Teamsters v.
Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259 (1964). See also note 128 and accompanying text infra.
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balance of bargaining power struck by Congress and thus frustrate the pur-
pose of the federal legislation. 61 Therefore, the Ohio law was held to be
preempted. 62
Despite these restrictions upon state regulation of labor relations, the
Supreme Court has made clear that not every state law which may poten-
tially infringe upon the policy objective of federal labor law is preempted. 63
If the activity regulated by the state is only a peripheral concern of the
NLRA or LMRA, 64 or if the state's interest in controlling the activity is
"deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility," 65 the Court has hesitated
to infer that Congress intended the states to be without regulatory
power. 66 The Court has stated that "It]he purpose of Congress is the ulti-
mate touchstone" 6 7 in determining whether state law is preempted. It might
be the case, as the Second Circuit suggested in New York Telephone Co.,
that "the conflict is one which Congress has decided to tolerate." 68
THE NEW YORK TELEPHONE Co. DECISION
In New York Telephone Co. the Supreme Court held that New York's law
authorizing the payment of unemployment compensation to strikers was not
preempted by federal labor law. 69 The majority initially recognized that the
payment or receipt of unemployment compensation benefits is neither pro-
hibited nor protected by the NLRA. 70 The Court stated that the main body
of labor law preemption cases, therefore, had little precedential value over
the case at bar because these cases dealt with conduct at least arguably
within the purview of the NLRA. 71 The Court consequently turned its at-
61. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1964).
62. Id. at 260.
63. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
64. Id. at 243; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
65. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
66. See, e.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (states can award tort damages for
injuries sustained through unfair labor practice); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131
(1957) (states can enjoin violent and obstructive activities); United Constr. Workers v. Labur-
num Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (states can award common law tort damages).
67. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). See also Malone v.
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947).
68. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 566 F.2d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 1977).
The Supreme Court also has stated that in a preemption case it could be found that Congress
intended to tolerate a degree of state interference with federal law. "Congress under the Com-
merce Clause may displace state power ...or it may even by silence indicate a purpose to let
state regulation be imposed on the federal regime." Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn,
375 U.S. 96. 103-04 (1963).
69. 440 U.S. at 546.
70. Id. at 529.
71. Id. at 529-30.
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tention to two cases in which state regulation of conduct neither arguably
prohibited nor protected by the NLRA was held to be preempted. 72
In Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 73 discussed previously, the Supreme
Court stated that the question whether local law must give way to the prin-
ciples of federal labor law ultimately depends upon whether the state law
would operate to frustrate the purpose of the federal legislation. 74 The
Morton Court also determined that the conduct 75 sought to be prohibited
by the state was specifically considered by Congress because Congress pro-
hibited closely related behavior. 76 Morton held that because the conduct
was addressed by Congress but not prohibited and because prohibition of
the behavior by the state operated to frustrate federal law, it could be in-
ferred that Congress intended that the conduct be fiee of all regulation. 77
The New York Telephone Co. majority found the dispositive fact in Morton
to be that the conduct was focused upon but not prohibited. 78 Since Con-
gress did not address the behavior in question in New York Telephone Co.,
the Court implied that preemptive intent should not be so easily inferred. 79
The Court also distinguished Lodge 76, International Association of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Cononission 80 fr'om the case
at bar. 81 In Lodge 76 the Court held that Wisconsin was without authority
to prohibit employees from refusing to work overtime during contract
negotiations in order to compel the employer to submit to their de-
72. Id. at 530. The two cases considered and distinguished by the Court were Lodge 76, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) and Local 20,
Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964). Although the Court is correct in stating that these
are the only two cases in which it has held state regulation of conduct neither prohibited nor
protected by the NLRA to be preempted, the Supreme Court has decided closely analogous
cases. For example, in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), the Court
held that certain concerted on-the-job activities designed to interfere with the employer's busi-
ness, but not prohibited by the NLRA, also could not be prohibited by the NLRB. It was
judged that prohibition of these activities would intrude on an area deliberately left unregulated
by Congress and was therefore preempted by federal labor policy. Id. at 499-500. Similarly, in
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), the Court held that the NLRB could
not forbid an employer to use the lockout as an economic weapon, even though the lockout was
not protected by the NLRA, since it could be implied that Congress intended that the lockout
not be prohibited. Id. at 314-15. As the dissent in New York Tel. Co. pointed out, the Court
has made clear that "[tihe States have no more authority than the Board to upset the balance
that Congress has struck between labor and management in the collective bargaining relation-
ship." 440 U.S. at 554 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346
U.S. 485, 500 (1953).
73. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
74. Id. at 258.
75. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra.
76. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1964).
77. Id.
78. 440 U.S. at 530.
79. Id. at 530-33.
80. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
81. 440 U.S. at 531-32.
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mands. 82 Because the majority in Lodge 76 considered this employee con-
duct to be "part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining,"
8 3 it
concluded that Congress intended that such conduct be left unregulated.
8 4
The situation in New York Telephone Co. was distinguishable, the Court held,
because it did not involve an attempt by the state to regulate or prohibit
private conduct instrumental to collective bargaining. 85 Instead, the major-
ity indicated that the New York statute had the broad purpose of insuring
employment security in the state by distributing benefits to unemployed
workers in general and was therefore a statute of general applicability.
8 6
The Court concluded that when a statute has a general purpose, it is more
difficult to infer congressional intent to preempt. 87
Other factors weighing against an inference of congressional preemptive
intent included New York's interest in paying unemployment compensation
to strikers8 8 and the fact that Congress was sensitive to the states' interest in
fashioning their own unemployment compensation statutes. 89 The Court
82. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132, 154-55 (1976).
83. Id. at 149, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960).
84. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132, 149 (1976).
85. 440 U.S. at 532.
86. Id. at 532-33.
87. Id. at 533, citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180 (1978) and Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
88. Id. at 534. The Court at this point made an analogy, by implication, between the case at
bar and cases where it has been alleged that the payment of public welfare benefits to strikers is
preempted by federal law. 440 U.S. at 534 & n.23. In these "public welfare" cases the courts
have been unwilling to infer congressional preemptive intent and, consequently, to hold the
payment of welfare benefits preempted, largely because of the recognition that states have sub-
stantial interests in making welfare payments to their citizens. See, e.g., Super Tire Eng'r Co.
v. McCorkle, 550 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1978); lIT Lamp Div. of
Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989 (lst Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933
(1971). The New York Tel. Co. Court believed that New York had a similar interest in paying
unemployment compensation to strikers and, therefore, implied that New York Tel. Co. should
be decided in the same way as the "public welfare" cases. 440 U.S. at 534 & n.23. A moment's
reflection, however, leads one to realize the faultiness of such an analogy. First, as the Court
recognized, public welfare benefits are not financed by the struck employer, as are unemploy-
ment compensation benefits. Id. at 534. Therefore, the economic impact of welfare payments
upon the outcome of a strike should be about one-half of the impact of the payment of un-
employment benefits, assuming equal payments. See Super Tire Eng'r Co. v. McCorkle, 550
F.2d at 908. Second, the state interest in paying unemployment compensation to strikers is
arguably less strong than the interest in paying welfare to strikers because the payment of
welfare is based on need, while unemployment benefits are based on joblessness that is not
necessarily related to need. See discussion of ITT Lamp Div. of Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v.
Minter, 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971), and Grinnell Corp. v.
Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973), in note 140 infra. See also
Comment, Welfare Assistance to Strikers in Need: The Protestant Ethic Revisited, 67 Nw. U.L.
REV. 245, 249-50, 252-53 (1972).
89. 440 U.S. at 539.
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stated that New York's law implemented a broad state policy reflecting that
state's conclusion "that the community interest in the economic security of
persons directly affected by a strike outweighs the interest in avoiding any
impact upon the collective bargaining process in a particular labor dis-
pute." 90  The Court further stated that the legislative history of the Social
Security Act 91 made clear that the states were to have broad freedom in
setting up their unemployment compensation programs. 92 For these
reasons, the Court held that it was "appropriate to treat New York's statute
with the same deference that [it had] afforded analogous state laws of general
applicability that protect interests deeply rooted in local feeling and respon-
sibility." 93
The New York Telephone Co. majority was further reluctant to infer pre-
emptive congressional intent because of the Court's view of the impact of
unemployment compensation payments upon a struck employer. Although
the Court accepted the district court's finding that New York's law altered
the economic balance of power between labor and management, the Court
maintained that the payment of unemployment compensation does not have
as substantial an impact on labor disputes as does direct state regulation of
labor-management relations. 94  Because unemployment compensation ben-
efits are not a form of direct compensation to strikers, but rather a disbursal
of public funds obtained partially from the federal government and, in New
York, partially from state employers as a group, the Court concluded that
the impact on the struck employer was to an extent mitigated. 95
Since New York's law was of general applicability, was analogous to laws
considered "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility," and had only
90. Id. at 534.
91. The Social Security Act established a federal unemployment compensation program
whereby an excise tax is imposed upon all employers in the United States which may be miti-
gated by a credit allowed to all employers who contribute to approved state unemployment
compensation programs. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3304 (1976). If a state unemployment compensation
plan meets further requirements, the state becomes eligible for federal funds to be used in the
administration of the state program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-503, 1101 (1976), and in the funding of
certain benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1103-1105 (1976). Some of the requirements which state plans
must meet concern eligibility for the receipt of benefits, see 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5) (1976), but
no provision concerns the eligibility of strikers.
92. 440 U.S. at 537. The Court relied heavily on Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v.
Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977), in support of its conclusion that states were to have great latitude
in setting up their unemployment compensation programs. In Hodory an employee who had
been involuntarily deprived of his job as a result of a labor dispute in which he was not involved
alleged that he had a right, under Title IX of the Social Security Act, to collect unemployment
compensation benefits. The Court held that Ohio had sufficient freedom when designing its
unemployment compensation program to exclude the employee from eligibility for benefits. See
also Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
93. 440 U.S. at 539-40.
94. Id. at 534-35.
95. Id.
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an indirect impact on labor disputes, the Court held that it could not infer
congressional intent to preempt in the absence of compelling evidence of
such intent. 96 Consequently, the Court then looked to the legislative his-
tory for compelling evidence that Congress intended to preempt any state
law which authorized the payment of unemployment compensation to strik-
ers. V The majority found no such compelling evidence in the history of the
NLRA. 9s Instead, by examining various indicia of congressional intent
found in the legislative history of the Social Security Act, 9 the Court de-
96. Id. at 540.
97. Id. at 540-45.
98. Id. at 540.
99. The Court cited the following materials in support of its proposition that Congress in-
tended that the states be free to pay unemployment compensation to strikers if they wished:
(1) S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935) [hereinafter cited as S. REp. No. 628.
The Court stated that this report referred to the New York statute as qualifying under the Social
Security Act guidelines and contained statements to the effect that the states are to have great
latitude in setting up their unemployment compensation programs. 440 U.S. at 541 & n.37. In
fact, the report did not state that New York's statute qualifies generally under the Social Se-
curity Act, but only implied that the statute qualifies in respect to the method of funding un-
employment benefits.
(2) 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5) (1976) which provides, inter alia, that a state may not deny un-
employment compensation to an applicant for refusal to accept work as a strikebreaker or refusal
to resign from a union as a condition of employment. This statute was cited as evidence that the
states were free to set up whatever kind of programs they wished, subject to only a few express
prohibitions. 440 U.S. at 542 & n.40.
(3) Hearings on S. 1130 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1935) (statement of Robert Wagner) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1130] in which a
principle sponsor of both the NLRA and the Social Security Act advocated local freedom of
choice with respect to unemployment programs. 440 U.S. at 541 n.36.
(4) Hearings on S. 1130 at 1326 in which it was stated "[tihe plan for unemployment compen-
sation that we suggest contemplates that the States shall have broad freedom to set up the type
of unemployment compensation they wish. We believe that all matters in which uniformity is
not absolutely essential should be left to the states." 440 U.S. at 537 n.28.
(5) Hearings on S. 1130 at 228, 472 (written submissions of Edmund Witte and Abraham
Epstein) in which it was recommended that benefits be withheld from strikers. These recom-
mendations were not adopted, and this congressional failure to act was cited as indicative of
congressional intent to allow states to pay unemployment compensation to strikers. 440 U.S. at
542-43 & n.41.
(6) Act of August 28, 1935, ch. 794, § 10(a), 49 Stat. 950 (1935) (D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
§ 46-310(f) (West 1968)) which provided that strikers not receive benefits under the District of
Columbia's program. This was cited as evidence of Congress' commitment to free local choice
and as an indication that Congress did not assume nor intend that the passage of the NLRA
would preempt the payment of unemployment compensation to strikers. 440 U.S. at 543 n.41.
(7) H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1947) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 5101. The House version of the LMRA, H.R. 3020 § 2(B), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947),
included a provision effectively denying the protections of the NLRA to a striker who received
unemployment benefits from a state by not classifying such a striker as an employee for the
purposes of the NLRA. This provision was deleted without comment by the conference commit-
tee report, H.R. REP. No. 510, and consequently from the version of the bill finally enacted.
440 U.S. at 544 n.44.
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termined that Congress intended that the states should individually make
the decision whether to pay unemployment compensation to strikers. 10 0
Thus New York's law was held not to be preempted.
CRITICISM OF THE COURT'S OPINION
The New York Telephone Co. decision is subject to question on the grounds
of misinterpretation of congressional intent and misapplication of precedent.
The finding that Congress intended that the states be free to pay un-
employment compensation to strikers is suspect when the legislative mate-
rials examined by the Court and other relevant materials are analysed. The
presumption of non-preemptive congressional intent, resulting from the
Court's holding that compelling evidence of congressional intent was neces-
sary to deem New York's law preempted, is questionable because of appa-
rent conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Similarly, the rationale which
led the Court to require compelling evidence of Congress' intent is uncon-
vincing, again, because of failure to follow precedent.
The Court's Analysis of Legislative History
It is clear that in determining whether state regulation is preempted by
federal law, the intent of Congress is controlling. 101 If it is true that an
examination of the legislative history of the Social Security Act discloses that
Congress intended that the states be free to pay unemployment compensa-
tion to strikers, the Court's holding that New York's law is not preempted is
undoubtedly correct. The legislative materials, however, do not give rise to
this inference, and, in fact, the congressional intent manifested in these
documents is at best ambiguous. 102
(8) 115 CONG. REc. 34106 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Mills) in which Mr. Mills pressed his
belief that the states have the freedom to pay unemployment compensation to strikers if they so
wish. The New York Tel. Co. Court cited Mills' statement as having been made in opposition to
an amendment proposed by the President which would have expressly excluded strikers from
receiving benefits. 440 U.S. at 544 n.44. In fact, the statement was not made in opposition to
the amendment, but was in response to a question put to him by representative Kyl as to
whether a person receiving disability benefits and a pension could receive unemployment com-
pensation if the state wanted to give it to him. 115 CONG. REc. 34106 (1969) (remarks of Rep.
Mills).
(9) 45 U.S.C. § 354(a-2)(iii) (1976) (Railway Unemployment Insurance Act) and 7 U.S.C.
§ 2 014(c) (1976) (Food Stamp Act). Under these programs strikers are eligible for benefits. This
was cited as evidence that allowing strikers to receive certain benefits does not force the Fed-
eral Government "to take sides in labor disputes." H.R. REP. No. 1402, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1970). 440 U.S. at 544 n.44.
100. 440 U.S. at 540.
101. See cases cited in note 67 supra. See also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362
U.S. 440, 443 (1960); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945).
102. See notes 104-110 infra. Three federal courts have agreed that evidence of congressional
intent in regard to preemption of state unemployment compensation laws is inconclusive. See
Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 457-58 (1st cir.), cert. denied, 414,U.S. 858
(1973); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Dep't of Labor and Indus. Relations, 405 F. Supp. 275,
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With one exception, the Court was unable to cite any document expressly
stating that Congress intended to allow the states freedom to authorize the
payment of unemployment compensation benefits to strikers. The exception,
remarks of a Congressman made in 1969, 103 are of little probative value not
only because the comment was made thirty-four years after the enactment of
the Social Security Act, but also because certain rules of statutory construc-
tion dictate that such remarks be given little weight. 104 In addition, the
Congressman made contradictory remarks in the same congressional de-
bate. 105 Much of the other extrinsic evidence relied upon by the majority
in New York Telephone Co. failed to support the Court's interpretation of con-
gressional intent because of contrary, but equally valid, inferences which might
be drawn from the evidence. 106 Still other evidence cited by the Court
286-87 (D. Hawaii 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978); Dow Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 57
F.R.D. 105, 108 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
103. 115 CONG. REC. 34106 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Mills).
104. The Supreme Court has made clear that statements of individual legislators concerning
the interpretation of a statute are generally held inadmissible as aids in construing legislation.
See, e.g., U.S. v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24
(1845). The Court has stated:
[I]t is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act
by the members of the legislative body that passed it by resorting to the speeches
of the individual members thereof. Those who did not speak may not have agreed
with those who did; and those who spoke might differ from each other.
U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897).
It is also a rule that the opinion of a member of a subsequent legislature in regard to the
meaning of a statute passed by a previous legislature is not entitled to much weight. U.S. v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963).
105. Representative Mills stated, "I hope we will bear in mind that the real objective of the
unemployment compensation is to take up the slack created when a person has lost his job
involuntarily." 115 CONG. REc. 34105 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Mills) (emphasis added).
106. The Court reaffirmed its conclusion in Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Ho-
dory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977), that the fact that Congress did not prohibit the states from condition-
ing benefits upon the acceptance of work as a strikebreaker or the acceptance of work which
would require joining a company union, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5) (1976), is evidence that Congress
did not intend to prohibit strikers from receiving benefits. 440 U.S. at 538 & n.29, citing
Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. at 488-89. As the dissent in New York
Tel. Co. pointed out, the prohibition against the states' imposing certain conditions upon the
receipt of benefits can just as reasonably be interpreted as indicating an intention to prohibit
interference with the collective bargaining balance struck in the NLRA. 440 U.S. at 564-65
(Powell, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Supreme Court by its decision in Nash v. Florida Indus.
Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967), made clear that states are without power, in some cases, to
condition benefits upon certain criteria even where there is no contention that the states are
prohibited from doing so by the Social Security Act. In Nash the Court held that the NLRA
preempted a state policy of denying unemployment compensation benefits to employees who
had filed unfair labor practice charges against their employers because this state action frus-
trated the purposes of the federal labor law. 389 U.S. at 240. Clearly, the Court's statement
that non-prohibition of a state regulation means that Congress intended that the states be free
to so regulate runs contrary to previous labor law decisions in which the Court has held
preempted state or NLRB action which was neither prohibited nor protected by express provi-
sion of the NLRA. See United States Supreme Court cases cited in note 134 infra.
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admittedly supported its view that Congress intended to pay unemployment
compensation to strikers, but did so by implication at best. 107 Many of the
inferences were drawn from congressional silence and inaction 108 as well as
The Court also relied on the fact that Congress enacted an unemployment compensation law
for the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 46-310(o (West 1968), which prohibited
strikers from receiving benefits. 440 U.S. at 543 n.41. This was cited as implying that Con-
gress intended that there should be local freedom of choice regarding the eligibility of strikers
for benefits. It could just as well be interpreted, however, as implying that Congress specifically
designed this bill to be free of any possible conflict with the NLRA and, consequently, safe for
the states to follow. According to the bill's sponsor, the District of Columbia statute was to
"serve as a beacon light which the states of the union could safely follow." 79 CONG. REC. 8274
(1935) (remarks of Rep. Ellen Bogen). See also H.R. REP. No. 858, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1935). It is further significant that the "draft bills"prepared by the Social Security Board which
were meant to be used as examples by the states provided that strikers were not eligible for
unemployment compensation benefits. DRAFT BILLS, supra note 3.
The Court further relied on the fact that the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (1976), and
the Railway Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 354(a-2)(iii) (1976), allow strikers to
receive benefits. 440 U.S. at 544 n.44. It was inferred that Congress judged that the provision
of welfare benefits to strikers does not conflict with the collective bargaining balance of power.
Id. at 544-45.
It is true that the provision of benefits to strikers under the Food Stamp Act does not frus-
trate the operation of federal law. Unlike unemployment compensation, food stamp benefits are
conditioned upon the claimant's income and assets becoming insufficient to supply the neces-
sities of life. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (1976). Receiving food stamps, therefore, does not appear to be
the type of benefit which would encourage a striker, to any great extent, to hold out longer.
The potential for upsetting the balance of bargaining power is small. The food stamp program
also differs from unemployment compensation in that the benefits are funded out of general tax
revenues, 7 U.S.C. § 2025(a) (1976), not directly by a participant in a labor dispute. As a result
there is even less possibility of such payments having a significant effect on the balance of
bargaining power.
The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA) does allow strikers to receive unemploy-
ment benefits which would be expected to have an impact upon the collective bargaining rela-
tionship. The RUIA, however, is a wholly separate program than the labor-management system
set up in the NLRA, and it has established an entirely different balance of power. Eligibility for
unemployment benefits was given to railroad workers as a special incentive: "Congress deemed
continuous, uninterrupted operation of railroads so vital to the public interest that it afforded to
railroad workers this special dispensation conditioned upon their compliance with procedural
safeguards plainly designed to defer strikes to the last possible moment." Brotherhood of Rwy.
& S.S. Clerks v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 239 F.2d 37, 42-43 (D.C. Cir. 1956). This statute is
therefore irrelevant in elucidating the intent of Congress regarding the payment of unemploy-
ment compensation to strikers in any context other than that of the RUIA.
In fact, the authorization of the payment of welfare benefits to strikers in the Food Stamp Act
and the RUIA may support the inference that Congress, when it intended to risk some altera-
tion of the collective bargaining balance which it created, was able to do so by express provi-
sion. It can therefore be inferred that if Congress intended to allow unemployment compensa-
tion benefits for strikers to alter the balance set up in the NLRA, it would have authorized such
payments expressly in the Social Security Act.
107. See notes 108 & 109 infra.
108. The Court found material the fact that written submissions to a Senate committee hear-
ing recommended that the states not be allowed to pay unemployment compensation to strikers,
and such a provision was not included in the Social Security Act. 440 U.S. at 542-43, citing
Hearings on S. 1130, supra note 99, at 228, 472. The Court relied on the fact that amendments
to the Social Security Act that would have effectively disqualified strikers from receiving un-
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isolated statements of general congressional intent, 109 neither of which are
strong bases for inference. Since there exists other evidence, not cited by
the Court, from which it can be inferred that Congress intended that
strikers not be eligible for benefits, 110 it becomes clear that no definite con-
clusion in regard to Congress' intent can be drawn from the legislative mate-
rials.
employment compensation benefits were suggested twice, and these amendments were not
adopted. Id. at 544 & n.44. See 115 CONG. REC. 18538 (1969); H.R. 3020 § 2(B), 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947).
This evidence is entitled to little weight. As the Supreme Court has made clear, "non-action
by Congress affords the most dubious foundation for drawing positive inferences." U.S. v. Price,
361 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1960). A leading authority on statutory construction has stated that legis-
lative silence is a " 'poor beacon' to follow in construing a statute." 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 49.10 (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND].
Non-adoption of amendments or recommendations by a congressional committee is a form of
non-action. Although it is generally true that the rejection of an amendment by the legislature
indicates that the legislature did not intend the bill to include the provisions embodied in the
rejected amendment, Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 89 (1914), it is not clear that non-
adoption by a legislative committee should be given the same weight. As the dissent pointed
out, the question of whether unemployment compensation should be paid to strikers was never
debated on the floor during consideration of the Social Security Act and received no attention in
the committee reports. 440 U.S. at 561-63 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent further noted that
no explanation was given for the non-adoption of the proposed amendments. Id. at 563 n. 18.
The First Circuit correctly assessed the significance of the conference committee's silent deletion
of the proposed 1947 amendment, which would have excepted strikers who received un-
employment compensation from the protections of the NLRA, when it stated: "Given this si-
lence, the enormous political controversy surrounding the Taft-Hartley Act, and the consequent
need for compromises, perhaps unreasoned or hasty, we cannot read this deletion and the
subsequent approval of the conference bill as specific resolution of the problem." Grinnell Corp.
v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 1973).
109. The Court relied on general statements from the legislative history of the Social Security
Act to the effect that the states were to have great latitude in setting up their unemployment
compensation programs. 440 U.S. at 537, 543, citing S. REP. No. 628, supra note 99, at 13;
Hearings on S. 1130, supra note 99, at 3, 1326. The Court inferred from these statements that
this latitude extended to the payment of unemployment benefits to strikers. This inference is
not a necessary one. A closer examination of the committee report reveals that the committee
desired that the "Federal Government should not attempt to dictate to the States which type of
unemployment compensation law they should adopt." S. REP. No. 628, supra note 99, at 14
(emphasis added). The word type, it is apparent from the report, refers to the authorized
method of funding unemployment compensation payments, of managing funds, and of distribut-
ing benefits. The committee, it is clear, was not referring to eligibility standards when it de-
scribed the wide latitude the states were to have. Id.
The Court also relied on the fact the S. REP. No. 628, supra note 99, at 13, implied that New
York's law qualified under the Social Security Act guidelines. 440 U.S. at 541. Under the
express guidelines of the Act as adopted, 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 503 (1976),
of course, it does qualify. The report, however, does not contain any reference to the striker
benefit provision of New York's law, nor to the problem of the eligibility of strikers in general.
Therefore, it can hardly be said that the committee's implication that New York's law was
acceptable under the Social Security Act can be read as an endorsement of the payment of
benefits to strikers.
110. For example, the Court failed to take notice of the fact that the legislative history of the
Social Security Act and its proposed amendments contain statements to the effect that un-
employment compensation was intended to be paid only to those involuntarily unemployed. See
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The Court's Presumption of Non-Preemptive Intent
Even if the New York Telephone Co. Court came to the conclusion that
Congress' intent as expressed in the legislative history was ambiguous, the
majority still would have held that Congress did not intend to preempt the
New York statute. This is true because the Court required a showing of
compelling evidence of congressional intent before it would deem New
York's law preempted. 11 In effect, the Court adopted a presumption of
UNITED STATES COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 21 (1935);
S. REP. No. 628, supra note 99, at 11; 115 CONG. REG. 34105 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Mills),
Nor did the Court consider the President's interpretation of the Social Security Act in regard to
the payment of unemployment compensation to strikers: "The unemployment tax we require
employers to pay was never intended to supplement strike funds to be used against them. A
worker who chooses to exercise his right to strike is not involuntarily unemployed." 115 CONG.
REC. 18538 (1969).
Additional evidence that Congress did not intend that strikers receive benefits can be inferred
from the expressed general purpose of the Social Security Act. One commentator, having made
a survey of the unemployment compensation committee reports (H.R. DOC. No. 81, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. vii, 8, 10 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 7, 8-9 (1935); S.
REP. No. 628, supra note 99, at 10, 11, 15), concluded "that the overriding purpose of Congress
was to provide a means for combating the severe hardships and distress of unemployment re-
sulting from cyclical depression." Haggart, supra note 1, at 673. A quote from S. REP. No. 628
is instructive:
From 1920 to 1936 there were at all times an average of at least 1,500,000 indus-
trial workers in this country who were involuntarily unemployed.
.The essential idea in unemployment compensation is the creation of reserves
during periods of employment from which compensation is paid to workmen who
lose their positions when employment slackens and who cannot find other work.
Unemployment compensation differs from relief in that payments are made as a
matter of right, not on a need basis, but only while the worker is involuntarily
unemployed. . . .Payment of compensation is conditioned upon continued involun-
tary unemployment.
Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added). Thus, in keeping with the policy of the Social Security Act, it
may be inferred that Congress did not intend that anyone voluntarily unemployed, including
strikers, receive benefits.
The majority opinion made a telling observation when it suggested that "this case may be
viewed as presenting a potential conflict between two federal statutes-Title IX of the Social
Security Act and the NLRA-rather than between federal and state regulatory statutes." 440
U.S. at 539 n.32. It suggested by this statement that if Title IX had never been enacted and
New York's own, not federally sanctioned, unemployment compensation statute had provided
benefits for strikers, there would have been little difficulty finding that Congress intended by
the NLRA to preempt such a statute. Because, however, Title IX was enacted after the NLRA
and New York's statute conforms to the requirements of Title IX, the question arises whether
Congress intended when passing Title IX to allow the states to pay unemployment compensa-
tion to strikers and thus amend the NLRA, If this is the true conflict involved in this case, the
dissent is correct when it points out that even if it can be implied from extrinsic evidence that
Congress intended the states to be free to give benefits to strikers when it passed Title IX,
since implied repeal or amendment of a statute is not favored, the NLRA should not be held to
be amended. 440 U.S. at 566 & n.22. (Powell, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has made
clear its disfavor of implied amendment. See U.S. v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 102 n.12 (1964);
U.S. v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939); Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46, 58 (1895).
111. 440 U.S. at 540.
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non-preemptive congressional intent. The adoption of this presumption ap-
pears to be erroneous.
In general, two factors have been of consequence to the Court in ascer-
taining congressional intent regarding preemption when all extrinsic and in-
trinsic sources of evidence of intent have been exhausted. 112 Many of the
decisions indicate that whether preemptive intent is to be inferred 113 is
simply a matter of determining whether the state law conflicts with federal
legislation or will frustrate the operation of federal law. 114 Other decisions,
112. The Court has been faced with such a problem in numerous cases. See, e.g., cases cited
in notes 114 & 138 infra. In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959),
the Court commented generally on the task with which it was faced in deciding whether Con-
gress intended that a state have the authority to award damages to an employer resulting from a
union's peaceful picketing:
[Tihese problems came to us as ordinary questions of statutory construction. But
they involved a more complicated and perceptive process than is conveyed by the
delusive phrase "ascertaining the intent of the legislature." Many of these problems
probably could not have been, at all events were not, foreseen by Congress. Others
were only dimly perceived and their precise scope only vaguely defined. This Court
was called upon to apply a new and complicated legislative scheme, the aims and
social policy of which were drawn with broad strokes while the details had to be
filled in, to no small extent, by the judicial process. Recently we indicated the task
that was cast upon this Court in carrying out with fidelity the purposes of Congress,
but doing so by giving application to congressional incompletion.
Id. at 239-40.
113. The Supreme Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), made
clear that it is proper to infer congressional preemptive intent from the fact of conflict with or
frustration of federal law:
Congress legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied ...
So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress. . . . Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the infer-
ence that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. . . .Or the Act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assured to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject. . . .Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective
of the federal statute.
Id. at 230 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
114. Labor law cases which have inferred preemptive intent from the fact of conflict with or
frustration of federal policy are: Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); Lodge
76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 148
(1976); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969);
Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 240 (1967); Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377
U.S. 252, 258 (1964); Local 24, Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296 (1959); Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945).
Cases, other than in the labor law context, supporting the proposition that preemption is pre-
sumed if state law conflicts with or frustrates federal policy are: Florida Lime & Avocado Grow-
ers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act);
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963)
(Federal Aviation Act and Railway Labor Act); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947) (United States Warehouse Act); Jerome v. U.S., 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943) (Bank
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however, make clear that a second factor, the state's interest in regulating
the conduct which touches upon federal law, must be considered in attempt-
ing to elucidate congressional intent in regard to preemption. 115
In the labor law preemption cases, the Court has found that when the
state's interest in regulation is "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsi-
bility," 116 it will not infer congressional intent that the state law be preemp-
ted and that the states be deprived of the authority to regulate. 117 In non-
labor law preemption cases, although the Court has not categorized state
interests as "deeply rooted," it has regarded certain state concerns as highly
important. Due to the state's special interest, congressional intent to
preempt the state regulation which protects these interests 118 is considered
unlikely.
Robbery Act); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (Federal Alien Registration Act of
1940); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) (Federal Food and Drug Act); Sinnot v.
Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243 (1859) (federal laws licensing ships engaged in interstate
commerce).
Justices Blackmun and Marshall, concurring in New York Tel. Co., 440 U.S. at 549
(Blackmun, J., concurring), and the Chief Justice, Justice Powell and Justice Stewart, dissent-
ing, 440 U.S. at 554 (Powell, J., dissenting), agreed that preemptive intent is inferred if the
operation of a state statute frustrates the operation of federal law.
See Comment, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of Federal Preemption, 2 J. PUB.
L. 391, 392-93 (1973). See generally Governmental Interests, supra note 49.
The federal preemption decisions have been inconsistent regarding the degree of frustration
or conflict necessary to infer preemptive intent. Early, the Court insisted that state law only be
preempted if there was "actual conflict" between state and federal law. Savage v. Jones, 225
U.S. 501, 533 (1912). Later, the actual conflict requirement was abandoned and it was only
necessary that the state law "stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Still later, it was deemed sufficient that
*'the federal statute would to some extent be frustrated." Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n
v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963). Recently, in the labor law cases, the
Court has appeared to be returning to the requirement of a larger degree of conflict or frustra-
tion and the use of the test set forth in Hines. See, e.g., Kewannee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117,
139-40 (1973). Cf. Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal Preemption Doctrine, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 304-09 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Catz & Lenard] (agreeing that
the recent trend is toward requiring a large degree of conflict, but interpreting Hines as man-
dating an expansive federal preemption doctrine).
115. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 188 (1978); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 304-05
(1977); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967).
116. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
117. Id. See also cases cited in note 115 supra.
118. See, e.g., Kewannee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein v. Califor-
nia, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Califor-
nia v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949). See also Governmental Interests, supra note 49, at 495-98,
506-08, 510; Catz & Lenard, supra note 114, at 307-09.
The "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility" language has not been used in the
non-labor law preemption cases no doubt because the state interests involved in those cases,
although important, were not as great as the state interests at stake in the labor law cases. In all
of the labor law cases, the concern deemed "deeply rooted" was the state's interest in protect-
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The two factors, federal law conflict and state interest, are not given
equal weight by the Court, however, when engaged in the process of infer-
ring congressional intent. 119 It is especially clear in the labor law cases 120
ing its citizens from personal torts by means of entertaining civil suits. See note 138 infra. In
the non-labor law cases, the state's interest has been in protecting its citizens from arguably
lesser harm than that resulting from tortious behavior. For example, in Kewanee Oil the state
interest was primarily in protecting corporations from misappropriation of trade secrets. Kewan-
nee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). In Goldstein the state concern was extending
copyright protection to recordings of music. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). In
Head the state interest was in protecting citizens from certain advertisements. Head v. New
Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963). And in Zook, the state was concerned with
protecting its citizens from inconveniences and possible physical harm resulting from shared-
expense passenger transportation. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
119. See notes 120 & 121 and accompanying text infra.
120. The secondary role of state interest in inferring congressional preemptive intent is also
apparent in numerous non-labor law cases. For example, in Head v. New Mexico Bd. of
Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963), a radio station and a newspaper, located in New Mexico but
serving parts of Texas as well, was enjoined by a New Mexico court from publishing advertise-
ments of a Texas optometrist in violation of New Mexico law. The statute was alleged to be
preempted by the Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §§ 1-609, 48 Stat. 1064,
1064-1104 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)) which comprehensively regu-
lated the radio broadcast industry but did not prohibit the advertising of optometric services.
The Court decided that the New Mexico legislation was not preempted for there was no "actual
conflict" between the state and federal law, and there was no evidence of congressional intent to
deprive the state of authority to regulate an area of such "fundamental local concern." 374 U.S.
at 430, 432. It appears that the state interest was held to outweigh the national interest in this
case. Nonetheless, it is clear that if actual conflict had been found, the Court would have
deemed the New Mexico statute preempted.
In Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), the Court expressly rejected the argument that
the purpose of the state legislature or the interest of the state in regulation can be of controlling
weight in divining congressional preemptive intent. Id. at 651-52. In Perez the Court was pre-
sented with the question whether Arizona's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which
provides that a discharge in bankruptcy of an automobile accident tort judgment has no effect
on the judgment debtor's obligation to repay the judgment creditor, was void under the suprem-
acy clause because it conflicted with federal bankruptcy law stating that a discharge in bank-
ruptcy fully discharges all but certain specified judgments. Id. at 643. Two earlier Supreme
Court decisions on similar questions held that the state law was not preempted. Kesler v.
Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Menley, 314 U.S. 33 (1941). Kesler
concluded that a similar provision in Utah's law left "the bankrupt to some extent burdened by
the discharged debt", and made "some inroad ... on the consequences of bankruptcy." 369
U.S. at 171. Nevertheless, because the law had the purpose of "enforc[ing] a policy against
irresponsible driving," and therefore effected an important state interest, the law was not
preempted by the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 369 U.S. at 169, 173. Perez overturned Kesler and
Reitz, holding explicitly that
We can no longer adhere to [this] aberrational doctrine . . . that state law may
frustrate the operation of federal law so long as the state legislature in passing its
law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration. Apart from the fact
that it is at odds with the approach taken in nearly all of our Supremacy Clause
cases, such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted
federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee report articulating
some state interest or policy-other than frustration of the federal objectives-that
would be tangentially furthered by the proposed state law.
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. at 651-52.
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that only when a state has a substantial interest in regulation and the poten-
tial or actual conflict with federal law is small has it been inferred that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt the state regulation. 121 Substantial conflict
121. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 196 (1978); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 300-01
(1977); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966).
All of the labor law preemption cases in which the Court has found the existence of a deeply
rooted state interest to lead to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to preempt the state
regulation which protected that interest have arisen where it has been alleged that the conduct
which the state sought to regulate was prohibited by the NLRA. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 194-95 (1978). See Supreme Court cases
cited in note 138 infra. In these cases, according to Sears, it has been inferred that Congress
did not intend to preempt the state regulation for two reasons:
First, there existed a significant state interest in protecting the citizen from the
challenged conduct. Second, although the challenged conduct occurred in the
course of a labor dispute and an unfair labor practice charge could have been filed,
the exercise of state jurisdiction over the tort claim entailed little risk of interfer-
ence with the regulatory jurisdiction of the Labor Board.
436 U.S. 180, 196. According to the Court in Farmer, the legitimate and substantial interests of
the state should be balanced against the potential for interference with federal law or the ad-
ministration of federal law, but "concurrent state-court jurisdiction cannot be permitted where
there is a realistic threat of interference with the federal regulatory scheme." Id. at 304, 305.
Justice Powell's understanding of the reason behind inferring non-preemptive congressional
intent when a state's law is considered deeply rooted is that these laws are "unlikely to interfere
with federal regulatory policy under the NLRA." 440 U.S. at 559 (Powell, J., dissenting).
It must be pointed out, however, that there is some authority to the contrary. Supreme
Court dicta may be read to support the proposition that even in the presence of substantial
conflict between state and federal law it might be inferred that Congress intended that state law
not be preempted. According to the Court in Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375
U.S. 96 (1963), "Congress under the Commerce Clause may displace state power . . . or it may
even by silence indicate a purpose to let state regulation be imposed on the federal regime." Id.
at 103-04. At first blush, this language seems to state that it can be inferred, even when intrin-
sic and extrinsic evidence of congressional intent is ambiguous and state law conflicts with fed-
eral law, that Congress intended to allow the state to frustrate federal law. A closer reading of
this decision, and of Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), which
was cited for the quoted proposition, however, indicate that such is only the case where the
conflict is not actual or the frustration substantial. Id. at 141-43.
Similarly, language in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), might be read so as to advocate the
use of an "evenhanded" balancing of state interest versus frustration of federal policy to deter-
mine whether Congress intended that a state's regulation be preempted: "[T]he decision to
preempt federal and state court jurisdiction over a given class of cases must depend upon the
nature of the particular interests being asserted and the effect upon the administration of na-
tional labor policies." Id. at 180. Yet even in Vaca where the Court set forth numerous reasons
which led it to infer that Congress did not intend to preempt state adjudication of certain
matters, it is clear that the paramount reason that state regulation was not denounced is that
there existed little possibility of conflict with federal law. Id. at 179, 180.
The first circuit, though, has espoused the use of an evenhanded balancing test in assessing
congressional preemptive intent. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 457 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973); ITT Lamp Div. of Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d
989, 992-93 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971). Grinnell said that when unam-
biguous evidence of congressional intent is lacking, a court should consider whether the state
law "palpably infringe[sI" upon the federal law and, if so, whether the state interest in regula-
tion is greater than the federal interest. 475 F.2d at 457. If the state law does not infringe or if
the state interest is greater than the federal interest, then there is no preemption. Id. The use
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with federal law leads almost inescapably 122 to the conclusion that Congress
intended the state law to be preempted because Congress has the power to
bar completely state regulation of certain areas. 123 In addition, a basic rule
of statutory construction dictates a presumption that the legislature intends
that its legislation not be denied full effect. 124
In light of the clear Supreme Court mandate that substantial frustration of
federal legislation compels the inference that Congress intended the conflict-
ing state law to be preempted, the New York Telephone Co. Court failed to
examine adequately the purpose of the NLRA and the extent to which New
York's law frustrated that purpose. The Supreme Court has described clearly
the purposes of the NLRA: "to redress the perceived imbalance ... be-
tween labor and management," 125 to "equitably and delicately structure the
balance of power among competing forces," 126 and to achieve nationwide
of such a balancing test has been advocated by at least one commentator. See Note, Labor
Law-Preemption of State Unemployment Compensation Statute by Federal Labor Law, 10
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1194, 1202-06 (1976).
The precedent upon which Grinnell advocated the use of such a balancing test is unclear.
Grinnell cited Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), in support of the test, but
Southern Pacific makes clear that state interest is only of import in deciding a preemption
question if the state law does not conflict with federal law. 325 U.S. at 776. The Southern
Pacific Court stated:
Congress ...will not be deemed to have intended to strike down a state statute
designed to protect the health and safety of the public unless its purpose to do so is
clearly manifested ...or unless the state law ... conflicts with ... [an] Act of
Congress, or plainly and palpably infringes its policy.
Id. (emphasis added). As the district court in Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Dep't of Labor &
Indus. Relations, 405 F. Supp. 275 (D. Hawaii 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978), was
quick to note: "There is no part in the formula for a 'balancing' of federal and state interests, as
suggested by the First Circuit. . . .[The Supreme Court cases] inquire only as to whether there
is a conflict between the statutes, but do not balance the interests underpinning them." Id. at
284 n.56.
122. It is possible, of course, that it may be clear in a given case that Congress did not
intend to preempt a state law which conflicts substantially with a particular federal act. For
example, the United States Warehouse Act, as originally enacted, provided: "That nothing in
this Act shall be construed to conflict with ... or in any way impair or limit the effect or
operation of the laws of any State relating to warehouses, warehousemen, weighers, graders or
classifiers...." United States Warehouse Act, ch. 313, § 29, 39 Stat. 490 (1916) (current ver-
sion at 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1976)).
123. Congress has power to exercise exclusive control over interstate commerce. See note 10
supra. Justice Holnes explained the relation between federal legislation regulating commerce
and state legislation, writing in Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. U.S., 266 U.S. 405 (1925): "This is
not a controversy between equals. The United States is asserting its sovereign power to regulate
commerce. . . .There is no question that this power is superior to that of the states to provide
for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants." Id. at 425-26.
124. Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945); Singer v. U.S., 323 U.S. 338 (1945); Davies
Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944). According to an expert on statutory construc-
tion: "A statute is a solemn enactment of the state through its legislature and it must be as-
sumed that this process achieves an effective and operative result. It cannot be presumed that
the legislature would do a futile thing." SUTHERLAND, supra note 108, § 45.12.
125. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965).
126. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971).
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uniformity in the balance struck by Congress. 12 7  Moreover, Congress in-
tended that, subject to the express prohibitions and protections of the NLRA
regarding the economic weapons which parties to a labor dispute are allowed
to use, parties should be free to bargain collectively and to use their re-
spective economic strengths to reach agreements favorable to them-
selves.128  The economic weakness of either party does not justify a state 129
or the NLRB 130 aiding a party by granting or denying the use of economic
weapons, 13 1
Whether the New York law which authorized unemployment compensa-
tion for strikers was preempted by the NLRA is, then, in the absence of
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent, a question of whether it sub-
stantially altered the balance of bargaining power struck by Congress in that
legislation. 132 It is clear, and the Court itself recognized, 133 that New
127. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 n.7 (1976); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Carmon, 359 U.S. 236,
241-44 (1959).
A Congressman has also succinctly expressed the design of the NLRA: "[T]he general purpose
of the National Labor Relations Act, as interpreted by the Board and the courts, is to attempt to
establish a uniform pattern of collective bargaining rules nationwide, without local variation."
120 CONG. REc. 22575 (1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
128. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970); American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 30Q, 317 (1965); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489
(1960).
129. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'u, 427
U.S. 132, 149 (1976).
130. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316-17 (1965).
131. The Court in Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), made this point clear when it stated:
But the economic weakness of the affected party cannot justify state aid contrary to
federal law for, as we have developed, "the use of economic pressure by the parties
to a labor dispute is not a grudging exception [tinder] . . . the [federal] Act; it is
part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining."
Id. at 149, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960).
132. Commentators have suggested that in light of the recognized federal policy of equalizing
bargaining power between unions and employers, it is illogical to insist that state neutrality in a
labor dispute requires non-payment of benefits. Fierst & Spector, Unemployment Compensation
in Labor Disputes, 49 YALE L.J. 461, 465 (1940). Cf. Shadur, supra note 4, at 299 (suggesting
that some strikes deserve to be financed because of, inter alia, unreasonable conduct on the
part of the employer). It is argued that since the employer is usually capable of greater endur-
ance than his workers, a strictly neutral state would merely be adjusting the unequal balance if
it authorized the payment of benefits to strikers. This argument fails for it proceeds on the
erroneous assumption that the paramount objective of federal labor law is in some quantitative
sense to make employer and employee equal adversaries in a labor dispute. It is true that the
objective of labor policy is to strike a balance of bargaining power between the parties, but the
balance struck was to be struck by Congress, not by the states. Both the states and the NLRB
"are without authority to attempt to 'introduce some standard of properly 'balanced' bargaining
power' . . . or to define 'what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in an
'ideal' or 'balanced' state of collective bargaining'." Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 149-50 (1976), quoting NLRB v. Insur-
ance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497, 500 (1960).
133. 440 U.S. at 531-32.
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York's law has substantially altered this economic balance. 134 Because the
balance is altered, the federal policy of free collective bargaining is frustrated
by the New York law, and it must be presumed that Congress intended to
preempt the state legislation.
134. The district court in New York Tel. Co. came to this conclusion after considering evi-
dence of the impact of the New York statute on both the CWA employees' economic ability to
stay out on strike longer and the petitioners' increased willingness to come to a settlement
quickly. 434 F. Supp. 810, 814-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). A similar conclusion was rendered by
another court considering similar evidence of the effect of unemployment compensation on a
labor dispute. Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations, 405 F. Supp.
275 (D. Hawaii 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978). The court in Hawaiian Tel. Co. found
that:
(1) 16.1% of the total man-days lost as a result of strikes in Hawaii between 1964
and 1973 may be attributed to the 4.8% of strikes during that period in which
unemployment compensation was paid to strikers. 405 F. Supp. at 278.
(2) Payment of unemployment compensation probably tends to lengthen strikes.
The average length of strikes in Hawaii between 1964 and 1973 in which un-
employment compensation was not paid to strikers was 29.9 days. During the same
period the average length of strikes in which benefits were paid was 64.4 days. Id.
(3) The employer's approach to bargaining is affected by the increased tax bur-
den. Id. at 279.
(4) Employers have been forced to settle strikes when they otherwise would not
have been settled. Id. at 280.
(5) Employee finances are key determinants of success of strikes and strike
threats. Id.
(6) During a strike, unemployment compensation provides a large percentage of a
striker's income. Id. at 281.
(7) Union members believe that unemployment compensation helps them to stay
out on strike longer. Id.
An extensive empirical study of the effect of welfare payments on strikes came to the conclu-
sion that welfare benefits during strikes "may well upset the relative collective bargaining posi-
tions of unions and management so greatly that the fundamental structure of collective bargain-
ing will be seriously threatened." THIEBLOT & CORWIN, supra note 28, at 220.
Arguably far less significant alterations of the union-management balance of power have been
deemed void by the Court for frustrating national labor policy. In Local 20, Teamsters v. Mor-
ton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964), it was held that a state could not prohibit union persuasion of a
customer of a struck employer to cease doing business with the employer. See notes 58-62,
73-77 and accompanying text supra. In Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), the Court determined that a state could
not prohibit employees from refusing to work overtime during contract negotiations. See text
accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
Although Morton and Lodge 76 are the only cases in which a state regulation which altered
the balance of bargaining power has been prohibited, on numerous occasions the Court has
barred the NLRB from altering the economic balance in ways arguably less significant than
compelling an employer to finance a strike against himself. For example, in NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), the Court held the NLRB could not prohibit
employees from engaging in on-the-job activities designed to harass the employer. In NLRB v.
Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960), the NLRB was barred from prohibiting peaceful picket-
ing by a labor union which did not represent a majority of employees. Also, in NLRB v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952), the Supreme Court held that the NLRB could not sit in
judgment upon the substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
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The majority, however, sought to avoid the presumption of preemptive
congressional intent by stressing both the interest of the state of New York
in the payment of benefits to strikers and the general nature of New York's
law. 135 As has been noted, when federal policy is substantially frustrated,
the Supreme Court has unmistakably commanded that state interest play no
part in the divination of congressional intent. 136 Therefore, the New York
Telephone Co. Court contradicted itself when it determined that the state
interest and the nature of the state law constrained it to require compelling
evidence of congressional intent to deem New York's law preempted.
Other Criticisms of the Court's Opinion
Assuming, arguendo, that state interest in regulation is of importance in
inferring preemptive intent even in the presence of clear fIustration of fed-
eral policy, other parts of the Court's analysis remain unconvincing because
of apparent contradiction of' its own precedent. In the labor law preemption
cases prior to New York Telephone Co., only state regulation of tortious con-
duct was deemed of such great state concern as to be "deeply rooted in local
l'eeling and responsibility" 137 and accordingly to lead to the supposition that
Congress did not intend to preempt state regulation of that conduct. 138 Not
only is the New York interest in paying unemployment compensation to
strikers not of the type previously founld by the Supreme Court to be
"deeply rooted," but it is also doubtful whether New York's interest is, in
135. See notes 86-93 and accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 119-124 accompanying text supra.
137. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Carmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
138. 440 U.S. at 559-60 (Powell, J., dissenting). Previously, according to San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garnon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), only "the traditional law of torts" had been so
classified. 359 U.S. at 247. Accord Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 136, 151 n.13 (1976).
Previous Supreme Court cases have held that states have "deeply rooted" interests in holding
unions liable for trespass (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180 (1978)), for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Farmer v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)), for libel (Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local
114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)), for threats of violence constituting malicious interference with business
(UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958)), for physical obstruction and threats of violence
(Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957)), and for mass picketing which obstructed
entrance to an exit from employer's factor, (Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942)).
In the "public welfare" cases, that is cases in which it was contended that the payment of
welfare benefits was preempted by federal labor law, the federal appellate courts have not
categorized the payment of welfare benefits to citizens as a "deeply rooted" state interest. See
Super Tire Eng'r Co. v. McCorkle, 550 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
827 (1978); ITT Lamp Div. of Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S 933 (1971). Rather, Super Tire held that payment of welfare be-
nefits to strikers was not inconsistent with federal labor policy, 550 F.2d at 908, and Minter
employed a balancing process "in which both the degree of conflict and the relative importance
of the federal and state interests are assessed," 435 F.2d at 992. See note 121 and accompanying
text supra.
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fact, substantial. 139 The New York Telephone Co. majority ignored the district
court's finding that the New York Legislature authorized the payment of un-
employment benefits to strikers more for administrative convenience than in
recognition of New York's interest in the protection of the health or safety of
its citizens. 140 The Court instead concluded, without citing authority, that
New York had determined that the state interest in the security of persons
economically affected by a strike outweighed the interest in avoiding an im-
pact upon the labor dispute. 141 The majority found additional support for
its position that New York's law should be treated as a law deemed "deeply
rooted" by demonstrating that Congress was sensitive to the states' interest
in fashioning their own unemployment compensation programs. 142 Al-
though the Court showed convincingly that Congress thought it wise to
leave many decisions regarding unemployment programs to the states, 143 it
is a non sequitur to conclude from this congressional policy that the states
139. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 434 F. Supp. 810, 818-19 (1977).
140. Id. The court examined the testimony of a member of the legislative advisory committee
which assisted in drafting New York's unemployment compensation law and of the Director of
the New York State Unemployment Insurance Division and determined that "the avowed pur-
pose of the New York Labor Law was subverted for .. . administrative convenience." Id. at
818. The avowed purpose was said to be that which § 501 of the New York Labor Law, N.Y.
LABOR LAw § 501 (McKinney 1977), declares: "[T]he public good ... require[s] .. . this mea-
sure for the compulsory setting aside of financial reserves for the benefit of persons unemployed
through no fault of their own." Id. at 818 n. 15 (emphasis added). Apparently the legislature felt
that the administrators of the unemployment compensation fund would not have the ability to
make complex determinations such as whether a person is unemployed due to a "strike or a
lockout or whether a particular claimant was a striker, locked-out employee, sympathy striker,
or laid off due to a strike." Id. at 818. The legislature, consequently, decided to give un-
employment compensation to all employees whose unemployment is due to a labor dispute for
ease of administration and not because of vital concerns for the health or safety of the citizens of
the state. Id.
Also of import in the district court's determination that the payment of unemployment com-
pensation to strikers was not a vital state interest was its consideration of a survey which indi-
cated that strikes last two to four weeks longer in New York than in other states, and that
933,000 fewer man-days per year would be lost in New York if unemployment compensation
was not available to strikers. Id. at 817. The court might have come to the conclusion that, on
the contrary, it was in the state's interest to exempt strikers from unemployment compensation
benefits. Id.
Supportive of the district court's conclusion that a state does not have a vital interest in
paying unemployment compensation to strikers is the first circuit's decision in Grinnell Corp. v.
Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973), where its earlier decision in
IlT Lamp Div. of Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 933 (1971), was distinguished. In Minter the first circuit determined that Mas-
sachusetts had a large interest in the payment of welfare benefits to persons who qualify regard-
less of their status as strikers. Id. at 494. In Grinnell, however, the same court opined that the
provision of unemployment benefits is "aimed at preserving the standard of living" rather than
at "alleviating real hardship" as is the case with welfare benefits, and that "as to unemployment
compensation for strikers, the state interest would appear somewhat narrower." Id. at 459-60.
141. 440 U.S. at 534.
142. Id. at 539.
143. Id. at 536-40.
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have, in fact, substantial interest in paying unemployment benefits to strik-
ers.
The New York Telephone Co. Court's use of the categorization of New York's
law as one of general applicability to support its presumption of non-
preemptive congressional intent is also in conflict with precedent. The high
Court has made clear that the general purpose of a law is irrelevant in de-
termining whether Congress intended that the statute be preempted, if the
statute, in fact, frustrates federal law. 144 Only in the absence of evidence
indicating the extent of state frustration of federal legislation has the Court
supposed that a statute of general applicability infringes upon federal law to
a lesser degree than a statute specifically designed to regulate labor rela-
tions. 145  Because the frustration of federal law effected by New York's
statute is documented, 146 the question of whether the law is of general
applicability is not important in divining congressional preemptive intent. 147
It seems evident that the New York Telephone Co. Court has departed in
numerous instances from its own rules of decision for the adjudication of
144. The Court has stated: "[I]t is well settled that the general applicability of a state cause of
action is not sufficient to exempt it from preemption. 'It has not mattered whether the States
have acted through laws of broad general application rather than laws specifically directed to-
wards the governance of industrial relations.' " Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 25,
430 U.S. 290, 300 (1970), quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
244 (1959).
Opinion to the contrary, however, has been registered. Concurring in Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), Justice Powell
wrote:
I write to make clear my understanding that the Court's opinion does not, however,
preclude the State from enforcing, in the context of a labor dispute, "neutral" state
statutes or rules of decision: state laws that are not directed toward altering the
bargaining positions of employers and unions but which may have an incidental
effect on relative bargaining strength.
Id. at 156 (Powell, j., concurring).
145. According to the Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Co. Dist. Council of
Carpenters Local 25, 436 U.S. 180 (1978):
While the distinction between a law of general applicability and a law expressly
governing labor relations is, as we have noted, not dispositive for preemption pur-
poses, it is of course apparent that the latter is more likely to involve the accomoda-
tion which Congress reserved to the Board. It is also evident that enforcement of a
law of general applicability is less likely to generate rules or remedies which conflict
with federal labor law policy than the invocation of a special remedy under a state
labor relations law.
Id. at 197 n.27 (emphasis added). The Sears Court also stated, however, that the crucial inquiry
is whether the state law will interfere with federal law. Id. at 197-98.
146. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
147. It may be that the Court's dependence upon the characterization of the New York law as
one of general applicability is erroneous for an additional reason. As Justice Powell pointed out,
it is difficult to think of a law which compels an employer to finance a strike against himself as a
law of general applicability. 440 U.S. at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting). Section 592.1, N.Y.
LABOR LAw § 592.1 (McKinney 1977), the only section of the statute being challenged by the
petitioners, specifically adjusts the collective bargaining balance of power by providing a special
eligibility rule for strikers. It does, in fact, appear to be a law which regulates directly the
relations between employees, their union, and their employer.
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claims that state law is preempted by federal law when extrinsic evidence of
the intent of Congress is lacking or inconclusive. Although it may be the
case that New York Telephone Co. continues a recent line of Supreme Court
opinions which have reflected tolerance of state law which touches upon
federal law, 148 the instant decision, unlike the recent preemption cases, 149
has been solicitous of state legislation at the expense of some of the basic
rules of federal preemption.
THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO.
The impact of New York Telephone Co. upon the law of federal preemp-
tion is questionable due to the fact that five Justices expressly disagreed with
the majority's use of the presumption of non-preemptive congressional in-
tent. 150 Because these Justices asserted, on the contrary, that preemptive
intent must be presumed if state law operates to frustrate federal policy
objectives, New York Telephone Co. may not necessarily effect a radical
change in the law of federal preemption.
On the other hand, because six Justices placed emphasis upon Congress'
expressed intent in concluding that Congress intended that the states be free
to pay unemployment compensation to strikers, 151 New York Telephone Co.
is clearly dispositive of the validity of state statutes such as New York's. By
the broad and unqualified language of the decision it would appear that all of
the state provisions currently in force which pay benefits to strikers under
varying circumstances 152 would be upheld in subsequent litigation. This
148. Prior to 1973, a Supreme Court decision had made clear that federal law is absolutely
supreme, and that any state law which conflicts with or frustrates the full effectiveness of federal
law is invalid, regardless of state interest in regulation. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,
651-52 (1971); note 120 supra. The Burger Court, however, has recently evinced a tendency to
interpret the effect of federal and state statutes so as to eliminate or minimize apparent conflict
between state and federal laws in terms or operation. See, e.g., Kewannee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S.
117 (1973). See also Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
The Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 639-51 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Shifting Perspec-
tives]. The Burger Court also has allowed acknowledged conflict between state and federal law
to stand when it viewed the conflict to be "merely trivial or insubstantial" (New York Dep't of
Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 423 n.29 (1973)), or "peripheral" (Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 135 (1973)), to the federal act's main
purpose. In this way the Court has recognized and protected what it considered to be important
state interests. See Shifting Perspectives, supra at 639. Yet the Burger Court has reaffirmed that
a law which stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment ... of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress" is void. Kewannee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974), quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). In none of the prior decisions has the Court
admitted, as the Court in New York Tel. Co. has implicitly done, that the state law in question
substantially frustrated a central purpose of a federal law and still found the state statute to be
valid.
149. See note 148 supra.
150. justices Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, Stewart, and Burger.
151. justices Stevens, White, Rehnquist, Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall.
152. See note 5 supra.
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hypothesis stems fi'om the fact that all but one 153 of the states which pay
unemployment compensation to strikers do so under more limited cir-
cumstances than does New York. 154
One result of the New York Telephone Co. decision may be that Congress
will be led to consider whether payment of such benefits should be expressly
prohibited. 155 Although amendments to accomplish this have been
suggested in the past, 156 they have not been considered by either the full
House of Representatives or the Senate. It is debatable whether an amend-
ment which would disqualify strikers from receiving benefits would be
passed by Congress. As the New York Telephone Co. majority pointed
out, 157 Congress has expressed its view that the states should be largely
unrestrained in designing their unemployment compensation programs. It is
unclear whether this policy would be applied by a majority of Congressmen
to foreclose the enactment of such an amendment. If the views of the major-
ity of state legislatures were those of Congress, however, an amendment
disqualifying strikers might well be enacted. In light of the demonstrated
effect of the payment of unemployment compensation to strikers on the du-
ration and outcome of strikes, 158 it may well be that the enactment of such
an amendment is desirable.
The New York Telephone Co. decision left open questions regarding the
scope of its application that could become important in future litigation. If a
153. Rhode Island pays unemployment compensation to strikers under almost the same cir-
cumstances as New York. See note 5 supra.
154. Payment of benefits to strikers if a strike resulted from an employer's violation of a
union contract, if the strikers are protesting dangerous conditions, if a striker has been laid off
from a subsequent job, or if the strike resulted from the employer's violation of the law, are all
arguably more limited circumstances than the payment of full benefits after a waiting period.
See note 5 supra.
155. It is doubtful that the states will amend their statutes to provide benefits for strikers as a
result of New York Tel. Co. because the states exempted strikers from receiving unemployment
compensation for reasons other than fear of conflict with federal labor law. Cf. Shadur, supra
note 4, at 296-300 (discussing theories justifying the labor-dispute disqualification, but not men-
tioning fear of conflict). One of the reasons given by the states for denying strikers the right to
receive benefits is the public policy determination that compensation should only be given to
those persons involuntarily unemployed. See, e.g., McKinley v. California Employment Stabili-
zation Comm'n, 34 Cal. 2d 239, 209 P.2d 602 (1949); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Durkin, 380 111.
11, 42 N.E.2d 541 (1942). Another reason is the notion that states should not side with one
party or the other in a labor dispute. See, e.g., Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Employ-
ment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 695, 151 P.2d 202 (1944); Bankston Creek Collieries, Inc. v. Gordon,
399 111. 291, 77 N.E.2d 670 (1948); Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan Unemployment Compen-
sation Comm'n, 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W.2d 260 (1944). A further reason is the feeling that it is
fundamentally unfair to force an employer to finance a strike against himself. See, e.g., Local
Union 11 v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 71 N.E.2d 637 (1947); Muncie Foundry Div. v. Review
Bd., 114 Ind. App. 475, 51 N.E.2d 891 (1943). In all likelihood the state legislatures still feel
these reasons for denying unemployment compensation to strikers to be valid.
156. See note 99 supra.
157. 440 U.S. at 537 n.28.
158. See note 134 supra.
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state, such as New York, were to provide even more liberal benefits to strik-
ers, the question of federal preemption of state unemployment compensation
programs could again arise. As the dissent in New York Telephone Co.
pointed out, the majority opinion gave no guidance in regard to whether a
hypothetical state unemployment compensation program would be allowed
to alter the balance set up by Congress to such an extent that federal labor
law would be rendered totally inoperative. 159 If a state statute provided
100% of a striker's wage in benefits financed 100% by the struck em-
ployer's contributions, the balance of bargaining power established by
Congress in the NLRA would become meaningless. A worker receiving such
benefits would be ambivalent regarding whether or not a strike was settled,
and could therefore hold out indefinitely in support of his or her demands.
Of course, the enactment of such a law is extremely improbable. Yet the
hypothetical existence of statutes which pay higher percentages of a worker's
salary, for a longer period of time, funded to a larger degree by the struck
employer, raises questions as to the precedential limit of New York Tele-
phone Co. If such a statute is one day enacted, and its validity under the
NLRA litigated, the question whether the Court's decision in New York
Telephone Co. has "open[ed] the way for [a] State tc undermine completely
the collective bargaining process within its borders" 160 will have to be
answered.
CONCLUSION
The New York Telephone Co. decision is perhaps particularly notable for
the confusion which it introduces into the law of federal preemption. Al-
though it has been observed that the Supreme Court has not developed a
uniform approach to preemption and that the Court's preemption decisions
often take on an unprincipled and ad hoc quality, 161 the Court consistently
has voided state statutes which substantially conflict with federal law, in the
absence of evidence of contrary congressional intent. With the advent of
New York Telephone Co., however, it is not clear that even this longstand-
ing principle is safe from the changing views of the Court's members. Be-
cause federal preemption doctrine is so dependent upon changing concep-
tions of the relationship between the states and the federal government,
perhaps it is not surprising that all aspects of the doctrine should be noted
for inconstancy, rather than for stability. Nevertheless, the principle that
preemptive congressional intent is presumed where the operation of federal
law stands to be frustrated by state law is a tenet derived from both the
supremacy clause and logic and should not be lightly disregarded.
James Warchall
159. 440 U.S. at 565 (Powell, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 566.
161. Shifting Perspectives, supra note 148, at 624.
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